ABSTRACT As an important method of making democratic decisions, voting has always been a topic of social concern. Compared with the traditional, e-voting is widely used in various decision scenarios because of the convenience, easy to participate and low cost. However, the proposed e-voting protocols are at the risk of excessive authority and tampered information, which makes it impossible to achieve true fairness and transparency in e-voting. By combining the blockchain technology, it enables to solve these problems with the decentralization and tamper-resistant features. Moreover, the misoperations of the voters will also affect this fairness, such as voting for non-candidates, abstention or repeated voting. Therefore, to ensure the efficiency of the voting process and maintain the fairness of the voting environment, it is important to append the function of audit in e-voting protocol. This paper proposes an e-voting protocol based on blockchain, which provides transparency in the process of voting. At the same time, this scheme has the ability to audit voters operating incorrectly and resist quantum attacks by adopting the certificateless and code-based cryptography. After performance analysis, our scheme is suitable for the small-scale election and has some advantages in security and efficiency when the number of voters is small.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voting as a way of making decisions symbolizes national and organizational democracy. With the development of network technology, e-voting has been applied to various decision scenarios due to its convenience, rapidity, easy participation and low cost. In 1981, Chaum [1] proposed the first e-voting protocol with the features of legality, anonymity, non-repeatable, tamper-resistant and so on [2] - [4] , which realized the purpose of election online. However, there is a unified manager who supervises the whole voting process of the existed e-voting protocols. This mode will lead to unfair elections caused by the dishonesty of the manager, and the existed techniques are difficult to solve it. To avoid the central authority, the blockchain with decentralization can be employed as a new carrier of e-voting.
The blockchain [5] is a decentralized distributed ledger system, which is constructed in a distributed network consisting of several interconnected nodes. And all the nodes in the network have a distributed ledger respectively, which contains the transaction records that have been recognized in The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Abdullah Iliyasu. the blockchain. It is able to read the contents of this ledger for anyone that has access to the network. In the blockchain system, all nodes manage and maintain this chain together. When the most nodes achieve consensus, the transaction is recognized and recorded in the distributed ledger of each node, which means that the recorded transactions cannot be modified. The voting process and results are recorded in the blockchain, and all the authorized nodes have the ability to check the recorded data on the chain. Therefore, all participants supervise the e-voting system together to make the voting fairer and more transparent. Blockchains include public chains, alliance chains, and private chains. Because our scheme applies to small-scale election scenarios, it is intended to be built on the private chain. Each transact is a voting process, and a new block is generated for each transaction. This approach not only ensures fairness and transparency in the election process, but also provides fairness in the election result. Besides, the blockchain technology also provides the anonymity of nodes, which be used in e-voting to achieve anonymous voting.
There are two methods of realizing anonymous in the blockchain. The first is to generate wallet address through public key as pseudonym [6] of node and hide its identity by pseudonym. Nevertheless, this method achieves no real anonymity since the real identity of the node can be determined by address clustering and other methods. The other method is to adopt the ring signature scheme for signing transaction data. In 2001, Rivest et al. [7] first presented the concept of the ring signature. Different from the group signature, there is no manager in the ring signature, the members in the ring need not be predefined and randomly composed. And the verifier knows the group of the signer but cannot determine who is the concrete signer. By employing the above two methods, even if the data on the chain is completely open, the identity of both parties in the transaction fails to be revealed. This paper implements anonymity of voter by using of the certificateless ring signature scheme for the blockchain.
Although completely anonymous voting environment protects voters' privacy, it is impossible to find malicious voters. This will not only reduce voting efficiency, but also be detrimental to the maintenance of the electronic voting system, and the audit function will be the focus on research consequently. In the traditional public key cryptosystem, there is a problem of user's public key certificate verification. Therefore, Shamir [8] proposed identity-based cryptosystem in 1984. At the same time, the problem of key escrow arises. To this end, in 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [9] first put forward certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) to solve the key escrow problem. In CLPKC, KGC is a key generation center to generate the partial private keys of users. The user combines it with the secret value of his choice to generate a complete public-private key pair, thereby reducing the dependence on the trusted center. In this scenario, we use the KGC in the certificateless ring signature algorithm as a regulator, allowing it to generate partial private keys of voters and implement the audit function of e-voting.
Most of the existed e-voting is built up the classical public key cryptography, whose security is based on the difficulty of number theory. Because the classical computer cannot solve the difficult problem of number theory effectively in the polynomial time range, the security of the scheme is guaranteed. With the recent research on quantum computing [10] - [13] , the quantum attack [14] has also become a new threat to the security of cryptographic algorithms. And code-based cryptosystem is one of the effective ways to resist the quantum attack. Different from the traditional public key cryptosystem based on the difficulty of number theory, the security of the code-based be reduced to the mathematical difficulty problem in coding theory [15] . In this paper, our scheme combines a certificateless traceable ring signature in [16] with the codebased algorithm, which can audit while resisting quantum attacks.
A. RELATED WORK
We researched some of the past articles and found that in traditional e-voting protocols, cryptographic tools are often used to ensure the security of voting, such as homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proof, ring signature, secret sharing, and so on. Martin Hirt proposed efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption in [17] to prevent the purchase and coercion of votes. At the same time, Lee and Kim [18] also realized the receiptfree voting by applying zero-knowledge proof. Subsequently, Chow et al. [19] improved this scheme by adopting escrowed linkable ring signature and realized the receipt-free voting while achieved universal verifiability. However, none of the above schemes are able to guarantee the anonymity of voters, nor can they provide the security features of auditing and anti-quantum. Hsiao et al. [20] offered an e-voting system based on the ring anonymous signcryption, which realized the anonymity and fairness. Huian Li provided a viewable e-voting scheme in [21] , which realized the visualization of elections by using verifiable secret sharing. However, [20] and [21] are also unable to audit and resist quantum attacks.
In recent years, with the popularity of blockchain, the combination of e-voting and blockchain has become a research hotspot. Shahzad B et al. presented a trustworthy e-voting system in [22] to adjust the block creates and seals by changing the hash function in the blockchain to achieve the credibility and fairness of the election. In the DATE proposed by Lai et al. [23] , the fairness of the e-voting and the privacy protection for voters were realized by employing the blockchain and ring signature technology. At the same time, it also had self-tallying feature. Unfortunately, because there is no thirdparty authority on the scheme, it cannot be audited. In an e-voting system based on blockchain and ring signature put forward by Wu [24] , transparency and privacy were solved. Lai and Wu [25] suggested an efficient decentralized anonymous voting system. The system was based on the Ethernet and used the ring signature scheme to ensure the transparency and privacy of the system. It achieved the goal of high efficiency and speed through parallel operation in the counting stage. Subsequently, McCorry et al. [4] offered a blockchain e-voting protocol, which not only achieved anonymity and transparency but also increased the modifiability of the ballot by utilizing blind signature and commitment technology in the blockchain. This has also become a new direction in the study of e-voting systems. McCorry Pd et al. proposed a blockchain smart contract for board elections in [26] , which is the first scheme that does not rely on any trusted authority to count and guarantee voter privacy. After that, Adiputra [27] proposed ''A Proposal of Blockchain-Based Electronic Voting System'' in 2018, which solved the general verifiability problem of the blockchain electronic voting schemes, although it did not discuss the privacy problem of e-voting. In a recent study, Li et al. et al. [28] proposed a blockchain-based e-voting scheme in distributed IoT. In this scheme, the blockchain is similar to the bulletin board, and achieved the fairness, maximal ballot secrecy, and self-tallying of e-voting. However, other security requirements such as anonymity been ignored. The above schemes achieved the basic requirements of the e-voting system but cannot resist quantum attacks. At present, there is no scheme has the ability to meet these requirements at the same time. To solve the above problems, this paper provides a blockchain e-voting protocol with audit and anti-quantum functions.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Currently, most e-voting protocols use public key cryptosystems based on numerical theory difficulties. The research shows that these schemes have problems of verifying the public key certificates, besides cannot resist quantum attacks. In addition, these schemes focus on the privacy protection for voters, while ignoring the accountability of violators. Since the imperfections in security and function, we construct an e-voting protocol in blockchain by combining the codebased public key cryptography with the certificateless cryptography, which can resist the quantum attacks and audit the violators. Our scheme has the following advantages.
(1) Our scheme solves the problem of verifying public key certificates in traditional public key cryptosystem by introducing certificateless traceable ring signature algorithm, besides realizes the audit function in the e-voting.
(2) In this paper, we adopt the code-based public key cryptographic algorithm, which makes the e-voting protocol can resist the quantum attacks.
(3) The presented e-voting protocol is supported by the blockchain technology, which guarantees the fairness and transparency of the voting process and results.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remaining of the article is structured in the following manner. Section 2 gives the related technologies involved in our e-voting protocol. Section 3 and 4 introduce the antiquantum e-voting protocol in blockchain with the audit function proposed in this paper particularly. Section 5 analyses the security and efficiency of this scheme, and the last section summarizes the whole paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section describes the cryptographic tools involved in our scheme and some hard problems.
A. CODE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM
In 1978, Robert McEliece [29] first suggested a public key cryptographic algorithm based on coding theory, which has not been broken up so far. Then the Niederreiter [30] algorithm is advanced, which security was reduced to the syndrome decoding (SD) problem of coding theory and is equivalent to McEliece algorithm [31] . SD problem is an NP-complete problem [32] , which proves that it can resist quantum attacks. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we propose the system model of the e-voting protocol with audit function based on blockchain which can resist quantum attacks, as shown in Figure 1 . And then list the symbols involved in the scheme. Finally, we provide the security model of our e-voting protocol. 
A. SYSTEM MODEL
There are four roles in the system, namely, regulator, voting initiator, voter and candidate. The following are descriptions of these four roles, voting and ballots. To ensure the security of our e-voting protocol, we make the following assumptions:
(1) Assume that the regulator is trustworthy, and it only goes online when he generates and distributes the Partial Private Keys (PSK ) for voters and recovers the identities of voters during the audit phase. In the process of voting, the regulator cannot intervene.
(2) Voters and candidates are extensible. During initialization and preparation, they join the blockchain system. Voters remain online during the implementation of the protocol and voluntarily cooperate with the regulator to recover their identity, when the regulator audits the voter identity corresponding to the ballot. Candidates are only online when verifying the signed ballot.
• Regulator: The regulator in our e-voting system is the KGC in the certificateless cryptosystem, which is responsible for verifying whether the registrant is up to the voting standard. Also, the regulator generates and distributes the PSK for registered legitimate voters in the system. The PSK of every voter is generated by the Master Key (MK ) in the initialization phase and its identity information ID i . At the same time, the identity of the voter and the PSK are established the corresponding relationship and archived as an important tool for audit. When the voting result is in dispute, the regulator revokes the anonymity of voters in the voting process through the correspondence ID − PSK , finding out the voters who misoperate and prosecute them. The regulator does not participate in the voting process.
• Voting Initiator: The voting initiator publishes the voting content and the Candidate List in the blockchain smart contract, in detail, the corresponding relationship between the name and the public key address (NameAddress) of a candidate.
• Voter: Staffs register with the regulator and become voters spontaneously. Since our scheme is suitable for the small-scale voting, the regulator has a list of company personnel beforehand and verifies whether they are eligible to vote when they register. After successful registration, the PSK generated and distributed by the regulator for voters. And voters compute the complete private key SK 2 and the public key address PK 2 according to the random secret value selected by them, and anonymous voting will be conducted through the SK 2 and PK 2. The voters should toe the mark of the e-voting system, namely, cannot abstain, cannot vote for noncandidates, one man one vote. When the nodes cannot reach a consensus on the counting results, the malicious voters will be restored by the regulator and take responsibility.
• Candidate: Candidates are announced by the voting initiator, which is essentially a node in the blockchain.
• Voting: The voting process is a transaction from voter to a candidate on the blockchain. The voter signs the ballot firstly, then broadcasts the signed ballot and its hash value to all nodes in the blockchain network. The node searches for the hash value collision according to the computing power or other consensus methods. After the verification is successful, the hash value is combined with the previous to form the Merkel tree recorded in the new block, so each block contains all the ballot information. In addition, the regulator does not interfere with the election, and our scheme provides the voter's anonymity by using the ring signature algorithm when voters sign the ballots.
• Ballot: A ballot is a transaction form on the blockchain that records the name and the public key address of the candidate. The formal definition of our e-voting protocol is presented below. In order to describe our scheme conveniently, some symbols and parameters will be used as an auxiliary. Table 1 gives a list of symbols and parameters used in this paper.
Definition 4 (Anti-Quantum E-voting Protocol in

B. SECURITY MODEL
In the practical environment, an e-voting protocol must satisfy the following security requirements.
(1) Conditional anonymity of voters. Our e-voting scheme ensures that no one can identify the real voter from the ballots during the voting process. At the same time, when the final election result does not reach a consensus, the regulator can restore the real identity of the voter corresponding to the ballot.
(2) Uniqueness. The uniqueness of the ballot requires that the ballots are non-repeatable and unforgeable. No voter can produce two identical ballots. At the same time, anyone cannot pretend to be a real voter to vote and cannot fake the real voter's signed ballot.
(3) Fairness. Fairness means that in the process of voting and counting, there will be no third-party authority to intervene in the choice of voters or influence the final election results.
(4) Verifiability. The verifiability of ballots includes personal verifiability and universal verifiability. Individual verifiability means that each voter participating in the election has the ability to view if his or her ballot is recorded on the blockchain or not. And universal verifiability means that anyone can verify the validity of the ballot and count the election results.
(5) Auditability. The auditability of the ballots means that when the election results fail to reach a consensus, the regulator can revoke the anonymity of the signed ballots and restore the real identity of the voters, thereby audits the voters that violated the rules.
(6) Anti-Quantum. Our scheme is anti-quantum, and the advantage is that it can resist the attack of quantum computers.
Based on the above security requirements, we consider the following oracles, which together simulated the adversary's ability to attack the security of the schemes:
• The Joining Oracle is defined as J O, it is executed when a new user joins the system, and the user's public key PK i ∈ PK is returned.
• The Corruption Oracle is defined as CO, on input a public key PK i ∈ PK and it outputs the corresponding private key SK i ∈ SK by querying the CO.
• The Signing Oracle is defined as SO, on input a ballot, a set U of all the voters' public keys and the signature voter's public key, it outputs a valid signed ballot σ .
Our scheme is simulated by a random oracle if its security can be proved in the random oracle model.
The unforgeability of the e-voting scheme is defined in the following game, which is played between the Simulator S and the Adversary A, where A is allowed to query oracles J O, CO, SO and the random oracle.
a. S generates and gives A the system parameters param. b. A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy. c. A gives S a set U of all the voters' public keys in PK, a ballot, and a signed ballot σ . A wins the game if the signed ballot σ generated by A can be recorded on the blockchain at the end of the voting algorithm and be verified at the counting and announcing. At the same time, all the public keys in U are query outputs of J O, no public keys in U have been input to CO and σ is not a query output of SO.
We denote by 
IV. CONCRETE SCHEME
The e-voting protocol in this paper consists of five phases. The schematic diagram of protocol timing is shown in Figure 2 . Following is a detailed description of the voting process in our scheme according to the steps in Figure 2 .
A. INITIALIZATION
In the initialization phase, the voting rules that voters are not allowed to abstain, vote for non-candidates, and one man one vote are determined. And the system initializes the regulator, KGC, to generate the MK . After that, generating the key pairs PK 1 i , SK 1 i for potential voters to encrypt and decrypt the PSK . In addition, all other protocols and algorithms in systems such as initialization blockchains are implemented.
Step 1 (Generate MK ): (1) The system chooses a cyclic additive group G 1 of order q whose generator is a point G on an elliptic curve. And G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. A bilinear mapping e :
where q is a large prime. Define a function f :
The system randomly generates a secret parameter s ∈ Z * q for the regulator as the MK . (3) Compute P pub = sG to generate the PSK for legitimate voters.
Step 2 (Generate PK 1 i , SK 1 i ): (1) The identity information ID i ∈ F n 2 , i = 1, 2, . . . , n of every potential voter is first selected.
(2) A binary irreducible (n, k) Goppa code C i is chosen that can correct t errors. A parity-check matrix H 0 i of C i , and a corresponding syndrome decoding algorithm
, and the voter obtains the public key PK 1 i and the private key SK 1 i =< M i , H 0 i , DHC H i >, which used to transmit the PSK securely in the voting phase.
(4) The public parameters of the system are generated, that
Simultaneously, the blockchain is initialized with the initialization block, which will serve as the starting block. And this block does not contain any ballots, in other words, no transactions are recorded, whereas it contains all the data about the voting, including the election time, participant information, the expected total number of ballots N prior and other public parameters. In this way, the blockchain is associated with a specific election, at the same time, the value of N prior also corresponds to different elections. And whole public data is recorded in the chain to prevent tampering, thus avoiding possible controversy. In addition, it should be noted that since the Goppa code is a linear code and an algebraic geometric code, there are many ways to decode it, and it is not unique. It is not the focus on research in this paper. The method described in [33] is selected.
B. PREPARATION
In this phase, the preparatory work before voting is completed through the following four steps. Owing to the code-based encryption and decryption algorithms are used to transmit the PSK , the security of the system is improved, and the quantum attack is resisted.
Step
(Announce Voting Content and Candidate information):
The voting initiator publishes the voting content and announces the Candidate List in the blockchain smart contract, namely the corresponding relationship Name-Address.
Step 4 (Register): (1) The member who wishes to participate in the election sends his or her ID i and PK 1 i to the regulator.
(2) The regulator verifies the ID i with the latest list of company personnel and knows which employees had the ability of voting during the initialization.
(3) When the ID i of the registrant is in the list, its identity will be registered.
(Generate and Distribute PSK ): (1) The regulator composes the identity information ID i of all voters into matrix
D is a matrix of all voters' PSK , q i is an element in Q, satisfying the relationship q i = H 1 (ID i ).
(3) Map D to a n × n matrix by function f , d i is an element in D, satisfying the relationship
(4) Encrypt the matrix by row through the PK 1 i , c = E PK 1 i (f (d i )), and send it to the voters.
Step 6 (Generate PK i , SK i ): (1) The voters decrypt c with their private key
(2) The voters randomly choose the secret value x i ∈ Z * q . (3) The voters compute the public key address PK 2 i and the complete private key
(4) Every voter gets his or her whole key pairs, which are
Step 7 (Announce the Voter List): The regulator collects and publishes the voters' public key addresses PK 2 i as the Voters List that represents the legitimacy of their identities. And the authenticated voters can execute subsequent operations.
C. VOTING
In the voting stage, the public key address of voter is hidden with ring signature technology, which realizes anonymous voting. The information about a candidate in the ballot will not be hidden to achieve real-time attention to the election results.
Step 8 (Generate the Signed Ballot): (1) Every voter chooses one of the candidates as the recipient of the VOLUME 7, 2019 transaction, then records his or her name and public key address in the transaction form. Such a transaction form is the Ballot =< Name i − Address i >, i ∈ {Candidate}.
(2) The voter signs this ballot. Our scheme provides the anonymous of a voter during the voting with the traceable ring signature technology. The specific signature process is as follows:
Suppose the signer is k. Ballot ∈ F n 2 . And the matrix A is the identities of n voters in the system. a. The signer k randomly chooses different r i ∈ Z * q , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, a j ∈ Z * q , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = k.
Step 9 (Send the Vote Successfully): (1) Compute the hash value of signed ballot h = H 2 (σ ).
(2) The voter broadcasts the signed ballot (Ballot) Sig k and its hash value h to the blockchain network.
(3) Other nodes in this network verify the signed ballot when they receive the broadcast message.
The process of verifying the signature is as follows:
b. Verify the validity of the equation e P pub ,
, if the equation is validated, the node finds the collision of the hash value h according to the computing power or other consensus methods. (4) The first node that completes the above steps records the ballot in the newly generated block, that is, Ballot takes effect, and also records the Merkel tree composed of the hash values of all the ballots, the N current updated to the current total number of ballots.
D. COUNTING AND ANNOUNCING
At this stage, the ballots will be counted, and the results of the elections will be announced according to the structure of the blocks in our scheme.
(All the Nodes View and Count the Vote Content):
The verifiers who interested in the election result to count the ballots by accessing the data on the block. According to the block structure shown in Figure 3 , there are the number and the content of the transaction in the body, and when entering the counting phase, the N current updates the total number of ballots for this election. The number of the transaction is the current total number of ballots N current . The content of the transaction is composed of all the current signed ballots. When counting, firstly verify the validity of the signed ballot (Ballot) Sig k = (Ballot, T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T n , S 1 , S 2 
) and verify the validity of the equation e P pub , n i=1 T i +h i PK 2 i = e (G, Z ), if the equation holds, the signature is correct and the original ballot is obtained. After that, the verifier continues to check Ballot =< Name i − Address i >, i ∈ {Candidate}. Voting in the expected time range T , at the end of T , the polls are obtained by counting the information of a candidate in every ballot. Finally compared with the N current and the election requirements N prior recorded in the initialization block.
Step 11 (Achieve Consensus and Announce Election Results): The counting result was published by every node and the final election result was generated through blockchain consensus algorithms, such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT), if N prior = N current . When the consensus was reached on the elections result within the limits of allowable errors, it will be published and recorded in the blocks, and then the election is going to be close. Otherwise, it shows that there are voters' misoperations in voting. The regulator audits the voters who violate the rules and revokes their anonymity with traceable ring signature algorithm afterward.
It should be noted that the consensus mechanism of this scheme, such as PBFT, ensures the consistency of results. In this paper, the choice of consensus algorithm is not the focus on research.
E. AUDIT
In the audit phase, the regulator will revoke the anonymity of voters through the following four steps, find the violators and hold them accountable.
Step 12 (Verify Signature): When N prior = N current or voters fail to reach a consensus on the counting result or still vote after the counting, and the regulator revokes the anonymity of voters who misoperate with the signature σ . Firstly, compute h i = H 2 (Ballot||f (T i ) ||f (U ) ||det (A)). Secondly, verify the validity of the equation e P pub , n i=1 T i +h i PK 2 i = e (G, Z ), if the equation is validated, the signature σ is correct.
Step 13 (Collecting P i ): The regulator collects P i = S i x i −1 from the corresponding voters according to the S i and the matrix A of voters' identities in the signature σ .
Step 14 (Verify e (S i , G + q i ) = e (P i , PK 2 i )): The regulator decides whether the bilinear pairing e (S i , G + q i ) = e (P i , PK 2 i ) is valid or not, and P i is validated when the equation holds.
Step 15 (Verify e (U , G + q i ) = e (V , PK 2 i )): Compute V = n i=1 P i , and revoke the anonymity of voters with e (U , G + q i ) = e (V , PK 2 i ).
In our protocol, it should be noted that we suppose the regulator is reliable. After generating and distributing the PSK for every legitimate voter, the regulator will not participate in the whole process of voting, counting and will not cheat in the audit process.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section will discuss the security performance of our protocol and evaluate efficiency. Finally, some related e-voting protocols are compared.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME Theorem 1 (Unforgeability): Based on the hard of CDHP, our e-voting scheme is unforgeable in the random oracle model.
Proof: Setup: The Adversary A is given the system
g, e, f } generated by the Simulator S.
Random Oracle: The Simulator S receives the hash request from the Adversary A, then S queries the hash function H 2 and returns the hash value to A as a response.
Joining Oracle J O: The Adversary A gets a set U = {PK 1 , PK 2 , . . . , PK n } of all the voters' public keys through n queries. Corruption Oracle CO: On input a public key PK i ∈ PK that is output from J O, and the Simulator S checks whether it corresponds to the set U. If it is, S stops immediately, otherwise, S outputs the corresponding private key.
Signing Oracle SO: On input a ballot, a set U and the signature voter's public key, then S simulates the following process:
(1) Choose a random index k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
(3) S selects the random number a k ∈ Z * q and computes
(5) Adversary A can adaptively query the SO. We prove the unforgeability of our scheme through contradiction. Assume that the Adversary A can forge a valid signed ballot
that was not obtained through the SO. According to the forking lemma for ring signature [34] , the Adversary A can forge another valid signed ballot
with non-negligible probability. The two forged signed ballots have the same randomness for the same content of ballot and the ring user group U formed by the voters.
According to the above formulas, we get
By using the forking lemma for ring signature, there are indexes i and j, which satisfy h i − h i = 0 and
Thus
The probability of
Based on the computational difficulty of CDHP, the probability that the Adversary A wins the game is negligible.
Theorem 2 (Conditional Anonymity): Our e-voting scheme is conditional anonymity.
Proof: We prove the conditional anonymity of our scheme from the following two points.
(1) In this e-voting system, the anonymous is realized by using the ring signature technology to hide the identities of voters. When voters sign the Ballot, they first compute S i = r i PK 2 i through the public key addresses of all voters.
(2) Secondly, when computing T k = a k Q k − n j T j + h j PK 2 j , their public key addresses are also required. S i and T k will be the part of the signed ballot (Ballot) Sig k . Therefore, the signer's public key address can be hidden in all of the authenticated voters, and anyone, including the regulator, cannot judge the determined signer from signature σ . Only when the audit is required, the regulator revokes their anonymity through cooperating with every voter.
Theorem 3 (Verifiability): Our e-voting scheme is verifiability.
Proof: Verifiability includes personal verifiability and universal verifiability. In terms of personal verifiability, according to the nature of the blockchain, all of the voters can check and count the transaction data on the chain to verify whether their ballots are counted. In terms of universal verifiability, because the distributed ledgers in the blockchain are public, anyone interested in the election results is able to get a copy of the ledgers, verifying whether the digital signature is correct, count the election results, and compare with the official results to ensure the verifiability of the electronic voting scheme.
The correctness of the digital signature is verified as follows:
Verifier (A) ) and verifies the validity of bilinear pairings
Theorem 4 (Auditable): Our e-voting scheme is auditable. Proof: Since the traceable ring signature technology is employed in our e-voting scheme, and the KGC in certificateless cryptosystem is introduced as the regulator who distributes the PSK used in signature to voters without participating in the voting process. When the consensus of voting cannot be reached, the anonymity of voter is revoked through a round of interaction with them and find the signer corresponding to the ballot.
The correctness of the anonymity revocation of the voter is verified as follows:
a. The regulator verifies the validity of bilinear pairings e (S i , G + Q i ) = e (P i , PK 2 i ).
b. The regulator verifies the validity of bilinear pairings e (U , G + Q i ) = e (V , PK 2 i ).
Theorem 5 (Resistance to Attacks): Our e-voting protocol is able to defend against the replay attack, the man-inthe-middle attack, the counterfeiting attack, the modification attack and quantum attack.
Proof: The details of the defense against the above attacks are as follows.
(1) Replay attack: In the process of generating signed ballots, the voters are required to choose random numbers
q . Therefore, it is possible to detect the replay of the signed ballot and conclude that our scheme can resist the replay attack.
(2) Man-in-the-middle attack: In the preparation phase, the generation of the key pair PK 2 i , SK 2 i that the voter uses to sign the ballot is based on CDHP. Any adversary cannot get the private key through the public values or parameters.
(3) Counterfeiting attack: Based on the proof of Theorem 1, any adversary is not capable of forging a signed ballot (Ballot) Sig k = (Ballot, T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T n , S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , U , Z , A) without the voter's private key.
(4) Modification attack: In our scheme, the voters sign the ballot and record the signed ballot on the blockchain. If the adversary tampers with the ballot, it can be found by verifying its digital signature. Secondly, based on the advantage of blockchain technology in tamper-resistance, it is impossible for an attacker to tamper with the recorded transaction, since every block of the chain contains the hash values of all transactions. The modification attack is successful if the attacker can modify the recorded ballots in each block. However, this probability is negligible due to the anti-collision of the hash function. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to modify the ballots and election results in the blockchain.
(5) Quantum attack: In our protocol, the regulator generates and distributes the PSK for each voter by using the Niederreiter algorithm. The algorithm is a cryptographic algorithm based on the code, and its security is reduced to the syndrome decoding (SD) problem of coding theory. This is an NP-complete problem, which is difficult to solve even in front of quantum computers with powerful computing power. So, our e-voting scheme is able to resist the quantum attack.
B. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISONS
In our scheme, the scalar multiplication, the point addition and the bilinear pairing on an elliptic curve, the point multiplication of matrix and determinant operation will be involved. For ease of description, the following definitions will be made in Table 2 . And Table 3 shows the computation overhead and communication overhead in different phase.
(1) Initialization
• The computation overhead: In the initialization phase, the computation overhead includes T mul + 2T mat .
• The communication overhead: In the initialization phase, the communication overhead between the system and the regulator is |r| bits. And because of the PK 1 i is a binary (n − k)n matrix, the communication overhead between the voters and the system is nw(PK 1 i ) bits, where w(PK 1 i ) represents its Hamming weight. The total communication overhead in initialization is
• The computation overhead: In the preparation phase, the regulator performs nT H 1 + nT mul and n − times Niederreiter encryption algorithm, voters perform one Niederreiter decryption algorithm, T add + 2T mul . The total computation overhead in preparation is n − times Niederreiter encryption algorithm, one Niederreiter decryption algorithm and nT H 1 + (n + 2)T mul + T add .
• 
• The communication overhead: In the voting phase, the signer broadcasts the signed ballot to the blockchain network, which creates communication overhead (2n + 2)|p| + w(A) + w(Ballot). (4) Achieve consensus and announce election results
• The computation overhead: The process of counting is the same as the ballot generation. After verifying the authenticity of all the signed ballots, the election result is obtained. Therefore, the computation overhead at this phase has been completed in the voting stage.
• The communication overhead: In the counting phase, each node generates statistical results and generates the final election result from a consensus algorithm. This process is completed by the blockchain network, and there is no process of interaction between the nodes, so the communication overhead is not generated. (5) Audit
• The computation overhead: In the audit phase, if the worst case is considered, the regulator needs 4nT e + nT add + nT mul .
• The communication overhead: In the audit phase, the regulator sends S i to the corresponding voter. Then the voter computes the P i with the corresponding private key x i and returns it to the regulator. Therefore, considering the worst case, the communication overhead needs 2n|p|. The performance of Niederreiter algorithm is related to its error correction ability t and length n. On the premise of guaranteeing the security of Niederreiter algorithm, such that t ∈ [19, 65] . The number of public keys increases with the increase of error correction ability t, while the information rate decreases with the increase of t [35] . The value of t should be determined according to the requirement of the number of public keys and the information rate.
In DELL Intel (R) Core (TM) i5 = 8250U CPU @ 1.60GHz 1.80GHz, we use JPBC and JAMA get the operation time involved in our scheme, as shown in Table 4 . And we are drawing through python matplotlib. The computation overhead of the initialization phase is fixed, it takes 9.15ms. And the computation overhead of the preparation, voting, and audit increases with the number of voters. Figure 4 to Figure 6 show the relationship of computation overhead with the number of voters in different phases.
In [20] , the e-voting system based on ring anonymous signcryption uses 7n + 4 T mul , 3n − 1 T add , 2n T H 2 and one modular operation. The computational cost of [24] depends on the time of signature and verification of ring signatures and block generation in bitcoins. And the efficient decentralized anonymous voting described in [25] , 5 T mul , one T H 1 and one T add are involved in generating the key pairs and ballots. The time of generating signature ballots and verifying ballots is linearly related to the number of ring members. Figure 7 compares the running time of our scheme with [20] , [24] , [25] under different values of n. Our protocol has some efficiency advantages when the number of voters is small, and it is suitable for the election activities within the company. Table 4 gives a comparison of the security requirement of our scheme and [20] , [24] , [25] . Our scheme has more advantages in security requirement than them. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a blockchain e-voting protocol with audit function is introduced. We adopt the code-based Niederreiter algorithm to resist the quantum attacks. In our scheme, the KGC in certificateless cryptosystem is introduced as a regulator. It not only realized the anonymous of voters but also provided the feature of the audit by combining with the traceable ring signature algorithm, to maintain the fairness and correctness of the election. Through the analysis of our scheme, we get the conclusion that when the number of voters is small, it has some advantages in security and efficiency, which is suitable for small-scale election; when the number is large, it achieves higher security by reducing part of efficiency. 
